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On the Irrelevance of the Segmentary Lineage Model in the Moroccan Rif

In attempting to analyze the precolonial Moroccan Rif in terms of the segmentary lineage model, David Hart overlooked the fact that violence in this region typically involved brothers and the sons of brothers in competition for inherited land, which was a commodity controlled by individuals, not lineages. What Hart depicted as a segmentary lineage system was actually a network of factions that cut across genealogical lines. Moreover, the political impact of the Moroccan state on the precolonial Rif was far more important than Hart suggested.

IT IS NOT UNUSUAL FOR SCHOLARS TO BE SO MESMERIZED by a model that they fail to see that their own data demonstrate its inadequacy. In the decades following the publication of *The Nuer* and *African Political Systems* in 1940, countless anthropologists "discovered" segmentary lineage systems in various societies where they did not exist.[1] One such ethnographer was David Hart, who did fieldwork in the Rif highlands of northern Morocco from 1952 through 1955 and intermittently from 1959 through 1966 (Hart 1976:xv). Hart's magnum opus, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif* (1976), ranks among the finest ethnographies ever written about the Berber highlands of Morocco. It is precisely the excellence of Hart's data that makes it possible to demonstrate the inaccuracy of his analysis.[2]

Our critique of Hart's segmentary interpretation of the precolonial (pre-1926) Rif can be summarized as follows. Most levels of precolonial Rifian social structure lacked any genealogical definition, even in "ideal" or "ideological" terms. Arable land, the most valued productive resource in this sedentary agriculturalist society, was not controlled by lineages. It was a commodity bought and sold by individuals. Similarly, conflicts involved not lineages but individuals and factions. These individuals were very often brothers and the sons of brothers in competition for arable land—as well as for power and status. Opposing brothers and patrilateral cousins were supported by factions that cut across genealogical lines. In many cases, men even paid "strangers" to kill their close patrilateral kin (Hart 1976:329, 334–335). The market councils that levied fines for murder were structured in terms of factional alliances and territory, not in terms of lineages, as Hart thought. The fines themselves were distributed primarily along factional rather than lineage lines. And the competition between the most powerful factions was directly linked to the role of the Moroccan state, which was more important than Hart realized.

The Segmentary Lineage Model

Paul Dresch has argued that lineage theory and segmentation should not be confused (1986:309). And logically they certainly are distinct. At the core of the segmentary model is the idea that

> each segment is itself segmented and there is opposition between its parts. The members of any segment unite for war against adjacent segments of the same order and unite with these adjacent segments against larger sections. [Evans-Pritchard 1940a:142]

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In principle, these segments need not be lineages. Evans-Pritchard speaks of the Nandi-speaking peoples of East Africa as having "a segmentary territorial system" but "not a lineage structure" (Evans-Pritchard 1940b:265, 266). And Ralph Nicholas characterizes some factional systems as "segmentary" (Nicholas 1966). But the fact remains that when anthropologists speak of "segmentary societies," they are generally referring to societies that are in some sense structured in terms of descent, in terms of *lineages* (Evans-Pritchard 1940a:211–212; Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:6–7, 10–11; Holy 1979; Kuper 1982). Hart is no exception. He contends that "the territorial system" of the precolonial Rif was "nothing but the lineage system spread out spatially on the ground" (Hart note 20, in Blanco Izaga 1975:158).

Among the basic questions most often raised with respect to the segmentary lineage model are the following: Is it a "folk model" in terms of which members of a specific society view their own political structures, either consciously or unconsciously? Is it an anthropological model of such a folk model? Or is it an anthropological model of how people in a specific society actually act? (See Combs-Schilling 1985; Eickelman 1981:90–104; Holy 1979; Karp and Maynard 1983; Peters 1967; Salzman 1978.)

In Hart's case, he opts, to some extent, for all of the above. He argues that the segmentary model is a more sophisticated version of the folk model in terms of which precolonial Rifi highlanders viewed their society (1976:235). And, although he admits that behavior did not always conform to it, he asserts that the segmentary model is also a partially accurate model of how precolonial Rifis often behaved (1976:235). But Hart's own data indicate that *any* attempt to apply the segmentary lineage model to the precolonial Rif entails serious distortion—unless one is deliberately trying to show to what extent the segmentary scale of sociability can be inverted.

It should be noted that there is nothing new about the assertion that the segmentary lineage model is irrelevant in the Moroccan context. This is the position taken by most of the interpretive anthropologists who have worked in Morocco (Eickelman 1976:120; C. Geertz 1979:235; H. Geertz 1979:348–355; Rosen 1984).[3] But the interpretivists, who have generally worked in or near Arabic-speaking lowland towns, have never attempted to demonstrate the empirical inadequacy of Hart's or Gellner's segmentary analyses of Morocco's Berber highlands (Hart 1970, 1976, 1981, 1984; Gellner 1969). This is true even of Roger and Terri Joseph, who have written a book (1987) about the Rif from a "semiotic" perspective strongly influenced by Geertz. While stressing "other kinds of complex and elastic political bonds," the Josephs acknowledge the importance of "agnatic corporate political unity" in the Rif (1987:33). Yet Hart's data make clear that such unity did not exist.[4]

The Rif: An Overview

The Rif mountain chain faces the Mediterranean in the shape of a concave arc extending from the Straits of Gibraltar to the mountains east of the Bay of al-Husayma. Moroccans, including Rifis, use the term *al-Rif* ("the Rif") to refer to the eastern mountains of the Rif chain and to the plains south of Melilla (al-Bu ʿAyyashi 974:107). This is how the term will be used here. The most distinctive feature of the people of this area (aside from their popular image of toughness and violence) is that most of them speak a Berber dialect known as *dhamazighth* (Hart 1976:340–341).

The precolonial economy of the sedentary agriculturalist Rif consisted primarily of rainfed cereal cultivation by plow, cultivation of irrigated vegetable gardens, animal husbandry (primarily goats in the highlands), and arboriculture (almonds, figs, olives, and pomegranates). There is no record of pastoral nomadism or transhumance ever existing in the Rifian highlands, although they do occur in the deserts farther east (Hart 1976:29; Seddon 1981). Plow agriculture has prevailed in the Rif since the 11th century at the very least (Brignon et al. 1967:76–77). But throughout the Rif chain, because of the dearth of arable valley land, plow agriculture was traditionally supplemented by slash-and-burn cultivation on hillside village communal lands (Sanchez Perez 1951:98; Munson 1989a).

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The precolonial Rif was divided into territorial entities known as *dhiqbaʾir* (plural of *dhaqbitsh*). The Rifian Berber word *dhaqbitsh* is a cognate of the Arabic word *qabila* (Hart 1976:235, 456). In the Moroccan context, both terms are usually translated as "tribe," although this is misleading in the sedentary agriculturalist highlands. Among pastoral nomads, a *qabila* is commonly understood to be a genealogically structured group in which the economic and political rights and duties of individuals are, to some degree, determined by their membership in corporate descent groups (Hart 1962, 1987; Marx 1977). But among the sedentary agriculturalist Rifis, the concept of *dhaqbitsh* has not had this meaning in the past century—and perhaps never did (Hart 1976:11–13, 239). In the *dhaqbitsh* of Aith Waryaghar (see Figure 1) during the early 1950s, nobody knew the origin of the *dhaqbitsh*'s name, which means "people of Waryaghar," although some suggested that it was related to the Rifian word *awragh* ("yellow") and the popular belief that there was gold in the Jbil Hmam massif (Hart 1976:239). No one ever told Hart that there was an ancestor named Waryaghar from whom the Aith Waryaghar was descended. And there was no genealogy linking the various components of the *dhaqbitsh* in terms of such descent (see Table 1).

This lack of genealogical definition is characteristic of the *qabaʾil* ("tribes") throughout the sedentary highlands of Morocco (Montagne 1930:36; Berque 1955:3–4, 226–227; Gellner 1969:39–40; Hart 1976:11–12; Munson 1981, 1984:64, 1989b). It is also characteristic of many nomadic or formerly nomadic *qabaʾil* (Berque 1974:22–34; Chiapuris 1979:38; Vinogradov 1974:55). But *some* nomadic *qabaʾil* did have traditions of common patrilineal ancestry that were socially and politically significant before colonial rule (Hart 1962:518, 1984:42–56, 1987:466–471). This was never the case among highland sedentary agriculturalists.

Just as the precolonial *dhaqbitsh* was territorially rather than genealogically defined, so too were the segments into which it was divided. The Rifian *dhiqbaʾir* were divided into *rbuᶜ* (sg. *rbaᶜ*), or "sections." Although *rbaᶜ* literally means "one-fourth" or "quarter," most *dhiqbaʾir* were not divided into precisely four *rbuᶜ*. Ibuqquyen had three, Timsaman had five, Axt Tuzin had five, Aith Waryaghar had eleven, while only Aith ᶜAmmarth had exactly four (Hart 1976:251). (We shall see that the *dhaqbitsh* of Aith Waryaghar was divided into five "fifths," some of which included more than one *rbaᶜ*. The structure of these fifths will only be intelligible after we discuss factions and the distribution of fines.)

In *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif,* Hart translates *rbaᶜ* as "clan," or as "subclan" when referring to a smaller *rbaᶜ* within a larger one (1976:244–245, 463). But this translation is inappropriate because the *rbaᶜ* was a territorial entity (often a valley and its contiguous slopes), the inhabitants of which almost never had traditions of common ancestry (Coon 1931:91–93; Hart 1976:235).

Within each *rbaᶜ* were a number of villages, which Hart prefers to refer to as "local communities" because of their dispersed settlement pattern (1976:263). As a community of people, the village was referred to as a *jmaᶜth,* or "assembly." (This term was also used to refer to the village councils composed of the adult males.) Like the *rbaᶜ*, the *jmaᶜth* was generally not identified with a specific descent group (Blanco Izaga 1975:108–109, 113, 133–134). In other words, it was not "an aggregate of persons clustered around an agnatic nucleus" (Evans-Pritchard 1940a:203).

The *Dharfiqth* (Which Hart Translates as "Lineage")

Villages were usually inhabited by a number of genealogically unrelated *dharfiqin,* many of them coming from different *dhiqbaʾir* (Blanco Izaga 1975:108–109, 133–134). Each *dharfiqth* inhabited a specific area in the village (1975:132). Hart defines the *dharfiqth* as an "agnatic lineage," in which descent from a common ancestor from four to eight generations removed from living members could be demonstrated genealogically (1976:456). But Roger and Terri Joseph contend that

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

Figure 1
The *dhiqbaʾir* ("tribes") and *rbuᶜ* ("quarters") of the central Rif highlands (after Hart 1976:251). Numbers 1–5 refer to what Hart calls "discontiguous segments" of *rbuᶜ* in Aith Waryaghar, not to the five fifths of this *dhaqbitsh*.

> individuals recognized an identity with [a] specific *dharfiqth* but were unable to trace any degree of relatedness to other members unless they were also members of an individual's three or four generational extended family. [Joseph and Joseph 1987:29]

Hart's own data show that *dharfiqin* were sometimes widely dispersed in different *dhiqbaʾir* with their members having no clear idea as to their genealogical relationship (1976:267). In other words, the *dharfiqth* could in some cases be viewed as a "clan" and in others as a "lineage."

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Table 1
Nomenclature of precolonial Rifian society.

Dhaqbitsh (pl. *dhiqbaʾir*)	Translated as "tribe" by Hart
Khums (pl. *khmas*)	"Fifth" of a *dhaqbitsh*
Rbaʿ (pl. *rbuʿ*)	"Quarter" or "section" of a *dhaqbitsh*
Jmaʿth (pl. *jmaʿath*)	"Village" or "local community"
Dharfiqth (pl. *dharfiqin*)	Translated as "agnatic lineage" by Hart
Liff (pl. *lfuf*)	"Faction"
Amghar (pl. *imgharen*)	"Big man," councillor, factional leader

The members of a *dharfiqth* referred to themselves as "people of my father's brother" (*Aith ʿAzizi* or *Aith ʿAmumi* in Berber, *Ulad al-ʿAmm* in Arabic) (Hart 1976:207). Being a member of a particular *dharfiqth* was a salient feature of a person's identity, and its members in a particular village were usually buried in the same area (Hart 1976:263). But the *dharfiqth* was not a corporate group. That is to say that membership in it did not imply any specific economic or political rights and duties, except in the case of some patrilineal descendants of saints who derived economic and political benefits from the belief in their holiness (Hart 1976:97, 100).[5] We shall demonstrate the generally noncorporate nature of the *dharfiqth,* first with respect to land tenure and then with respect to the Rifian vendetta.

Land and Corporateness

As might be expected in a sedentary plow agriculturalist society, arable land was the most highly valued natural resource in the precolonial Rif, as it is today (Hart 1976:38). Although Hart often speaks of such land as if it were controlled by corporate lineages, it was in fact generally private property *(mulk)* bought and sold *by individuals* (Hart 1976:97; Jamous 1981:35). In the Rif, as in the other sedentary agriculturalist highlands of Morocco, this was not a new phenomenon induced by Morocco's incorporation into "the world capitalist system" or by Spanish rule (1926–56). It had existed for centuries (see Berque 1955:84, 168–169, 361, 363–367; Munson 1980:33).

Hart unintentionally demonstrates this by means of his extremely valuable list of land titles from the 18th through the 20th centuries in an appendix of *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif* (1976:507–510). The first title concerns the "sale of pomegranate trees" in 1724; the second, dated 1736, involves a woman who sold some land to her brother (1976:507). The latter sale demonstrates that siblings did not share access to land by virtue of belonging to a common lineage. The notion of a jurally significant lineage is completely absent from the bill of sale, as summarized by Hart. The woman had inherited the land from her father and was now selling it to her brother. She was not selling the usufruct to a parcel of land controlled by a descent group. She was selling the land itself, plus the trees on it. Already in the early 18th century (and probably long before that), the most valuable land in the Rif was a cash commodity bought and sold by individuals.

Hart gives many other examples of land sales, including some involving individuals from one *dhaqbitsh* ("tribe") buying land in another (1976:110, 242–243, 507–509). It is true that Hart sometimes speaks of "lineages" or "tribes" as being involved in these transactions, but he is in fact speaking of individuals. For example, in 1870 the Fqir Azzugwagh, born in the *dhaqbitsh* of Igzinnayen, bought some land in the adjacent *dhaqbitsh* of Aith Waryaghar for 30 *mithqals*—a *mithqal* being a unit of currency worth 29 grams of silver (Hart 1976:326; Brignon et al. 1967:309).[6] Azzugwagh bought this land jointly with a man of Aith Waryaghar *to whom he was genealogically unrelated* (Hart 1976:325). In the text of his book, Hart speaks of this land as having been bought from "the lineages" of Ihammuthen and Yinn Hand w-ʿAbdallah (Hart 1976:326). But in his list of land titles, Hart notes that the land in question was bought *from two individuals,* not from *dharfiqin*; one of the individuals was a woman (Hart 1976:508). Elsewhere Hart speaks of a man

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from the *dhaqbitsh* of Aith Waryaghar buying some olive trees "from the Igzinnayen" in 1829 (Hart 1976:507). But in response to a question about this particular sale, Hart has conceded that the olive trees were sold *by an individual* from the *dhaqbitsh* of Igzinnayen (personal communication, 1979). All the other sales referred to by Hart also involved individuals.

The only land in any way controlled by descent groups in the precolonial Rif was some *hbus,* inalienable religious property, the revenue of which was sometimes distributed among the patrilineal descendants of a saint (Hart 1976:97, 100). These people were, and are, scattered in many different villages, *dhiqba'ir,* and towns. Such property, which only included an infinitesimal percentage of cultivable land, was usually donated to a mosque or to a saint's shrine *by individuals* (Hart 1976:100).

Most arable land of any value was privately owned *mulk,* which was inherited equally by sons, with daughters receiving half a son's share (Hart 1976:97, 101): "It is commonly recognized that brothers often do not get along well together, and for this reason alone division is virtually automatic after the father dies" (1976:98).[7] Arable land was thus generally owned by individuals.

As for village communal land, the land of the *jma'th,* it was controlled by the village council of adult males, not by a descent group (Hart 1976:99). It will be recalled that the Rifian village typically contained a number of unrelated *dharfiqin.* Individual families, including some that had recently immigrated from other villages or "tribes," would be allowed to cultivate village communal land, which was usually hillside scrub forest used primarily for slash-and-burn cultivation, grazing, charcoalmaking, and gathering firewood (Hart 1976:99).

In short, land in the precolonial Rif, since the 18th century at the very least, was not controlled by descent groups—with the marginal exception of a few holy *dharfiqin* that received a share of the crops or revenues from religious endowments. The existence of individually owned land bought and sold for cash in highlands conventionally referred to as "tribal" will undoubtedly surprise some. But the fact is that private property, *mulk,* has prevailed for centuries throughout the sedentary highlands of Morocco, alongside communal village land and the less important religious endowments (see Berque 1955:84, 168–169, 361, 363–367; Montagne 1930:248–249; Munson 1980:33, 1981:252).

Violence and Corporateness

Just as the Rifian *dharfiqth* was not corporate in an economic sense, so too did it lack corporateness in a political sense. We have seen that rather than being controlled collectively by *dharfiqin,* land was inherited equally by sons, with a half share for daughters. This system of partible inheritance meant that sons and the sons of sons were in direct competition for the most valued resource in the sedentary agriculturalist Rif. As in the Pukhtun highlands of Pakistan, violence in the precolonial Rif typically evolved out of this competition between brothers and the sons of brothers (Ahmed 1980:27, 94, 128, 294; Barth 1965[1959]:109–110; Hart 1985:53–58, 65–66, 80–85; Jamous 1981:133; Lindholm 1982:56, 65, 67; for comparable tensions without comparable violence, see Aswad 1971:32–33, 78–85, 114–115).

Some of Hart's best ethnography involves the reconstruction of what he calls the precolonial Rifian "feud" (Hart 1970, 1976:329–338). But in anthropological usage, the notion of "feud" is usually associated with the existence of politically corporate descent groups collectively responsible for vengeance and compensation (Middleton and Tait 1958:19; Peters 1975:xii–xiv). None of the Rifian conflicts described by Hart involved such groups (Hart 1976:308, 329–338). We shall therefore refer to them as "vendettas" (Peters 1975:xiii–xiv).

Hart's excellent reconstruction of what he calls "the Imjjat feud" illustrates the distinctive features of the Rifian vendetta (1976:325–338). The people of the Imjjat *dharfiqth* could demonstrate common patrilineal descent from one Yusif u-Yahya (David Hart,

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personal communication, 1988). No one knows why the *dharfiqth* is named Imjjat, which is a place name. The great-grandson of Yusif u-Yahya, according to the genealogy given Hart, was a man usually referred to as the *Fqir Azzugwagh,* or "redheaded member of a Sufi brotherhood," because he belonged to the Darqawa order. In the mid-19th century, the Fqir Azzugwagh fled from his village in the *dhaqbitsh* of Igzinnayen because he had murdered a man. He settled in the *dhaqbitsh* of Aith Waryaghar, in the mountainous southeastern *rbaᶜ* of Aith Turirth, where he married a local woman with whom he had four sons, ᶜAmar, Mzzyan, Muh, and Muh the younger, as well as a daughter named Fadhma (Hart 1976:326). With the help of his sons, the Fqir became one of the two most powerful men in the *rbaᶜ* of Aith Turirth, despite being an immigrant from another *dhaqbitsh* (Hart 1976:329). The other strong man in the *rbaᶜ* was al-Hajj Mᶜawsh of the "autochthonous" *dharfiqth* of Yinn Hand w-ᶜAbdallah (Hart 1976). The Fqir and al-Hajj Mᶜawsh led the dominant factions (*liffs*) of Aith Turirth in the late 19th century (1976:330). The Fqir died in the first decade of the 20th century, after having divided his land equally among his four sons (1976:103). (His daughter Fadhma died before he did.)

The Imjjat vendetta evolved out of the murder of the Fqir Azzugwagh's son Muh by a member of the Imjjat *dharfiqth* in the Fqir's natal village of Hibir in Igzinnayen (Hart 1976). After Muh Azzugwagh's death, his brothers Mzzyan and ᶜAmar killed his murderer—their agnate. Then Mzzyan married his dead brother's widow and thus became the stepfather of her daughter Fattush. Mzzyan's brother ᶜAmar wanted this girl to marry his son so as to get de facto control of the land she had inherited from her father. But Mzzyan arranged for her to marry a friend of his and retained de facto control of her land for himself (1976:330). Soon the sons and grandsons of the Fqir Azzugwagh were divided into two factions: that of Mzzyan Azzugwagh and that of his brother ᶜAmar.

These two opposing factions (whose core members belonged to the same *dharfiqth*) replaced those of al-Hajj Mᶜawsh and the Fqir Azzugwagh as the two dominant factions in the *rbaᶜ* of Aith Turirth, with al-Hajj Mᶜawsh now supporting Mzzyan Azzugwagh (1976:332). Some members of al-Hajj Mᶜawsh's *dharfiqth,* however, belonged to the faction led by ᶜAmar Azzugwagh (1976:272, 332). Virtually all the men in Aith Turirth, as well as many in the neighboring *rbaᶜ* of Timarzga and the *dhaqbitsh* of Igzinnayen, were allied to one faction or the other (1976:332). "Tribal" and *rbaᶜ* boundaries, like "agnatic solidarity," did not constrain conflict in the precolonial Rif.

Although many men outside the Imjjat *dharfiqth* eventually joined one of the two factions led by the two brothers Mzzyan and ᶜAmar, the vendetta remained primarily a family affair with the principal murders involving the sons and grandsons of the Fqir Azzugwagh—*both as killer and as victim* (Hart 1976:329–337). ᶜAmar Azzugwagh himself was killed by his brother Mzzyan, who was in turn killed by ᶜAmar's son Muh n-ᶜAmar (1976:334).

The precolonial Rif inverted the conventional wisdom that, in the tribal regions of the Islamic world, marriage occurred within the "lineage" and murder without. Marriage within the *dharfiqth* was in fact rare whereas murder within it was commonplace. Of 42 marriages involving members of the Imjjat *dharfiqth,* only three were with other members of the *dharfiqth* (Hart 1976:327). But the great majority of murders in the Imjjat vendetta involved members of the *dharfiqth* killing other members of this group—with the other victims usually being affines and/or matrilateral relatives (1976:329–337; Munson 1982:485). Being kin did not mean being kind.

One might suggest that the Azzugwaghs were perhaps a slightly unusual family and that one cannot make generalizations about the corporateness of the Rifian *dharfiqth* on the basis of the Imjjat vendetta alone. However, of the four other vendettas Hart describes in *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif,* all involved the murder of brothers, of brothers' sons, of fathers' brothers, or of sons of fathers' brothers (1976:324–325). Hart provides further evidence of such intrafamilial vendettas—usually precipitated by conflicts over land—in his forthcoming *The Aith Waryaghar and their Rifian Neighbors* (1990).

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Jamous also emphasizes the importance of such conflicts among close agnates in the eastern Rif (1981:128–134).

"Big Men"

Hart correctly emphasizes the importance of the precolonial councils that met at weekly markets (1976:283–303). These councils were composed of factional leaders called *imgharen,* or "big men" somewhat reminiscent of their Melanesian counterparts (Sahlins 1968:88–90). Literally, *amghar* means "full-grown adult male," from the Berber root meaning "to grow, to grow old, to be big" (Hart 1976:283, 452). *Imgharen* would start accumulating power in their local village council, which was composed of all adult males. Then the more powerful would move up to the weekly market council. And the very powerful would belong to the council of their *dhaqbitsh* as a whole, although such "tribal" councils appear to have been rarely convened (1976:287).

> The principle of recruitment was based upon what Erola aptly terms *"la ley del mas fuerte":* the stronger an *amghar,* the quicker he rose to the highest representational level, and his strength was measured in terms of (1) his own physical courage; (2) the number of his agnates, *liff* [faction] allies, affines, and other constituents, and the number of guns they could command; and (3) his wealth and personal resources. Once in office, the tenure of an *amghar* was theoretically for life, but more often than not his life was cut short by a bullet, or a dagger, or a billhook, or even by poison in his tea: the competition for political office was extremely fierce and of a markedly "dog-eat-dog" character. A weak *amghar* was a no-good *amghar* and he never rose above the level of the local community. [Hart 1976:284]

Needless to say, having a large number of agnates was not terribly useful if many of them were in a hostile faction *(liff)*—as was typically the case. The *imgharen* were heads of joint or extended families and, when they were really powerful, of factions that included genealogically unrelated allies (1976:335–337). They were not heads of lineages.

Councils, Factions, and Fines

The weekly market councils imposed fines upon murderers (Blanco Izaga 1975:305). Each council had a written legal code *(qanun)* specifying the amounts of these fines, depending on whether or not the murder was committed at a market or on a market day. These codes demonstrate the importance of collective punishment by the representatives of "the body politic," even though they did not eliminate the vendetta. They also illustrate the absence of politically corporate lineages. A murderer's *dharfiqth* was not collectively responsible for vengeance or compensation in the case of murder (Hart 1976:308, 337). How could it have been in a society where murder typically involved brothers and the sons of brothers in conflict over land? (See Scheffler 1986:344–345.) The *dharfiqth* of the Azzugwaghs could not possibly have been collectively responsible for the murder of ʿAmar Azzugwagh by his brother Mzzyan or for the resultant murder of Mzzyan by ʿAmar's son Muh n-ʿAmar (Hart 1976:334, 337).

Hart contends that the distribution of the fines for murder among the *imgharen* of the weekly market councils reflected "the segmentary system," or "more accurately, perhaps, it was a faithful reflection of the inherent compromise between the segmentary and the territorial systems" (1976:295). But there was no segmentary system to compromise. What Hart perceived as a system of lineages was in fact a network of factions.

The market councils, which Hart calls "clan councils," were usually named after the *rbaʿ* (or "quarter") where they were located. But they were in fact governed by genealogically unrelated *imgharen* from different but adjacent *rbuʿ* and often even from different but adjacent *dhiqbaʾir* (Hart 1976:283, 300–303). For example, the fines collected by the council of the Wednesday Market of Aith Turirth (in the southeastern corner of the *dhaqbitsh* of Aith Waryaghar) were divided among genealogically unrelated *imgharen* from three adjacent *rbuʿ* of the *dhaqbitsh* of Aith Waryaghar and an adjacent *rbaʿ* of the *dhaqbitsh* of Axt Tuzin, just east of Aith Waryaghar (Hart 1976:301–302). At the older Sunday

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Market of Izimmuren, also in the Aith Waryaghar *rbaᶜ* of Aith Turirth, *imgharen* from two *rbuᶜ* of the *dhaqbitsh* of Igzinnayen (southeast of Aith Waryaghar) participated in the market council alongside genealogically unrelated *imgharen* from adjacent *rbuᶜ* of the *dhaqbitsh* of Aith Waryaghar (Hart 1976:302). It will be recalled that Hart, like everyone else, translates *dhaqbitsh* as "tribe." But one is struck by the apparent irrelevance of "tribal" boundaries in the composition of the market councils that were a major, if not *the* major, institution of local government in the precolonial Rif.

One is also struck by the irrelevance of genealogical segmentation in the composition of the market councils and in the distribution of the revenue from the fines they imposed. Early in the 20th century, at the Wednesday Market of Aith Turirth, equal shares of fine revenue went to the genealogically unrelated councillors *(imgharen)* who led the two dominant factions in the *rbaᶜ* of Aith Turirth: al-Hajj Mᶜawsh and the Fqir Azzugwagh, the latter being an immigrant to the *dhaqbitsh* of Aith Waryaghar from the nearby *dhaqbitsh* of Igzinnayen. (As has already been noted, the factions of Mᶜawsh and Azzugwagh eventually merged with those led by the Fqir Azzugwagh's two sons Mzzyan and ᶜAmar.) A similar division of fines along factional rather than lineage lines occurred at the Sunday Market of Izimmuren (1976:302). We shall now demonstrate that this appears to have been the general rule.

In addition to the weekly market councils, there were infrequently convened councils of the *imgharen* from an entire *dhaqbitsh* (1976:303). The only example Hart gives of a meeting of the council of the *dhaqbitsh* of Aith Waryaghar is when the *imgharen* of this *dhaqbitsh* met in 1908 to swear loyalty to the Moroccan sultan Mulay Hafid, whose rule was being threatened by the revolt of Bu Hmara (1976:365).

Hart contends that the fines collected by the *dhaqbitsh* council of Aith Waryaghar were distributed among the five "fifths" *(khmas)* into which the *dhaqbitsh* was divided (1976:313): I, the primarily northern *rbuᶜ* of Aith Yusif w-ᶜAri and Aith ᶜAri and the southern *rbuᶜ* of Aith Turirth, and Timarzga; II, the western *rbaᶜ* of Aith ᶜAbdallah; III, the eastern *rbuᶜ* of Aith Bu ᶜAyyash and Aith ᶜAdhiya; IV, the southwestern *rbaᶜ* of Aith Hadhifa and the southeastern one of Aith ᶜArus, plus the northeastern village-cum-*rbaᶜ* of Iᶜakkiyen; and V, the northern central *rbaᶜ* of Imrabdhen (Hart 1976:297–298).

Hart did come across a few origin traditions for the five fifths of the Aith Waryaghar, but except for the holy fifth-cum-*rbaᶜ* of the Imrabdhen, these had no relationship to the internal structure of the fifths or to the distribution of fines in them (1976:239–241). As in the case of the distribution of the fines at the weekly market councils, descent had nothing to do with the distribution of the fines among the five genealogically unrelated fifths of Aith Waryaghar. For example, in the *rbaᶜ* of Aith ᶜAdhiya in fifth III, we find the *amghar* of the holy *dharfiqth* of Aith Bu Qiyadhen, which claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad through a local saint, receiving shares alongside "lay" *imgharen* whose *dharfiqin* came from the Ghmara region west of the Rif and others claiming to be descended from the Marinid dynasty (al-Bu ᶜAyyashi 1974:237–242; Hart 1976:254, 502).

But while the distribution of the *dhaqbitsh* council fines was not genealogically determined, nor was it simply a reflection of territorial boundaries either. Fifth III was composed of the adjacent eastern *rbuᶜ* of Aith Bu-ᶜAyyash and Aith ᶜAdhiya, each of which received half of the fines allotted to the fifth as a whole (Hart 1976:502–503). The Aith ᶜAdhiya share was divided four ways, with one fourth going to the village of Aith Tazurakhth (see Figure 1), all the genealogically unrelated *dharfiqin* of which had originated in other *dhiqbaʾir* (Hart 1976:502–503; Blanco Izaga 1975:175). Out of the share going to this village, one-fifth was handed over to what Hart refers to as the "lineage" of Aith Bu Stta in the village of Aith Bu Khrif in the adjacent *rbaᶜ* of Aith Bu ᶜAyyash—*because of liff affiliation* (Hart 1976:298).

Hart, following Blanco Izaga, has drawn his map of the five fifths of the Aith Waryaghar (upon which Figure 1 is based) largely along the lines of fine distribution, which was in fact based on *liff* alliances as well as territory. This, and not "lineage scission and re-

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duplication," accounts for the apparent territorial discontinuity of some *rbuᶜ* and fifths in Aith Waryaghar, the biggest *dhaqbitsh* in the Rif (1976:267). We have seen that what Hart calls a "lineage" in the village of Aith Bu Khrif in the *rbaᶜ* of Aith Bu ᶜAyyash received a share of the fine allotted to the adjacent *rbaᶜ* of Aith ᶜAdhiya (at the eastern edge of Aith Waryaghar) because of *liff* affiliation. But another seven "lineages" in this same village received one-fourth of the *dhaqbitsh* council fines allotted to the *rbaᶜ* of Aith Bu ᶜAyyash (1976:502). In other words, the villagers of Aith Bu Khrif were divided into two *liff*s and *liff* membership was the crucial determinant of fine distribution. The "lineages" to which Hart alludes were actually individual men and their households and *liff* allies. Fighting very often involved adjacent households shooting at each other, and the men in these adjacent houses usually belonged to the same *dharfiqth* (1976:263, 314).

The central role of *liff* affiliation in fine distribution is corroborated by further evidence from the village of Aith Tazurakhth at the eastern edge of the eastern *rbaᶜ* of Aith ᶜAdhiya. As already noted, this village received one-fourth of the fine allotted to the *rbaᶜ* of Aith ᶜAdhiya, one-fifth of which went to the Aith Bu Stta "lineage" in the village of Aith Bu Khrif in the adjacent *rbaᶜ* of Aith Bu ᶜAyyash because of *liff* affiliation (Hart 1976:298). The remaining four-fifths allotted to the village of Aith Tazurakhth were distributed as follows: two-thirds went to "5 ½ lineages" of the Aith ᶜAisa "lineage-group" and one-third went to "4 ½ lineages" of the Aith Luqman "lineage group" (1976:254, 502). The explanation of this split into five-and-a-half and four-and-a-half lineages is that one "lineage" in the village of Aith Tazurakhth "was itself split in half in its own immediate liff alignments" (1976:503).

*Liff*s were usually named after the *dharfiqth* of their leaders—a figure of speech that was perhaps partially responsible for Hart's confusion of *liff*s and lineages. Thus the *liff* of ᶜAmar Azzugwagh was known as "the Imjjat *liff*," even though it did not include everyone in the *dharfiqth* of Imjjat and did include genealogically unrelated allies (Hart 1976:302, 333). So we can surmise that what Hart refers to as the "lineage groups" of Aith ᶜAisa and Aith Luqman in the village of Aith Tazurakhth were actually *liff*s named after the *dharfiqth*s of their *imgharen*. *Liff*s rather than lineages were clearly the central political units of local conflict in precolonial Rifian society.

In addition to what he views as "lower-level" *liff*s, Hart contends that there were also "upper-level" *liff*s that linked *rbuᶜ* (1976:313–314). (The *liff*s we have discussed thus far linked individuals and their households in several *rbuᶜ*.) If this hypothesis of two separate levels of factions were correct, then one might be tempted to speak of a segmentary system of balanced *liff*s rather than lineages, with lower-level factions fusing into upper-level ones in the face of external threat. But, to begin with, Hart repeatedly demonstrates that opposing *liff*s were not usually balanced: one was typically larger and stronger than the other (1976:254, 316–317, 322, 333, 358, 502–503). And "lower-level" *liff*s did not generally fuse in the face of external foes. When Muhammed bin ᶜAbd al-Karim led the Rifians in their war against the Spanish (1921–26), he often had to appoint two officials to be in charge of a particular *rbaᶜ* because the *imgharen* who led the *liff*s in the *rbaᶜ* would not unite even in the context of their holy war against Spanish colonialism (Hart 1976:384–385).[9] Hart does not give any examples of "lower-level" *liff*s focusing to become "upper-level" ones.

It would appear then that what Hart referred to as "upper-level" *liff*s linking *rbuᶜ* were simply dominant *liff*s linking men and households in various *rbuᶜ*. For example, what might appear to have been an "upper-level" *liff* alliance between the southern Aith Waryaghar *rbaᶜ* of Timarzga and the northern Igzinnayen *rbaᶜ* of Asht ᶜAsim (Hart 1976:303) was in fact simply a *liff* alliance between the dominant *amghar* of Timarzga, Shaykh ᶜAmar nj-Muqaddim, and the dominant *amghar* of Asht ᶜAsim, al-Hajj Biqqish (1976:335–336, 358, 398). Other men in both of these *rbuᶜ* remained in *liff*s consistently opposed to these two powerful *imgharen* (1976:398). Thus, just as we cannot speak of "lower-level" *liff* alliances between lineages, so too we cannot speak of "upper-level" *liff* alliances between *rbuᶜ*. Indeed, it would seem that we cannot speak of two levels at all, only of *liff*s that tended to dominate particular *rbuᶜ*, in part because of *liff* allies from other *rbuᶜ*.

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Factional Leaders and the Moroccan State

Imgharen tended to ally themselves with men with whom they were not in direct competition. Thus we find that the dominant *imgharen* in adjacent *rbuᶜ* subject to the same official representative of the Moroccan sultan were usually in opposite *liffs*, while the dominant *imgharen* in adjacent *rbuᶜ* not subject to the same official were *liff* allies (Hart 1976:316, 356–359). This was probably because the *imgharen* in the same *dhaqbitsh* were competitors vying to be the sultan's representative and tax collector, whereas *imgharen* of adjacent *rbuᶜ* not in the same *dhaqbitsh* were not. Hart's data demonstrate that it was only in relation to the Moroccan state that the *dhaqbitsh* was a politically cohesive unit (1976:358, 365).

Hart contends that in the 19th century the central Rifian highlands, including the Aith Waryaghar, were independent of the Moroccan sultanate, or *makhzen* (1976:351). But he provides a massive amount of historical evidence indicating otherwise (1976:349–368). Further evidence of the subordination of the precolonial Rif to the Moroccan state can be found in many historical sources (al-Zayyani 1969[1886]:77–78, 99, 103, 105 in Arabic text, and 183–184, 190, 194–195 in French translation; Ayache 1979:199–227; al-Buᶜ Ayyashi 1974:237–242; al-Duᶜayyif 1986[1818]:46, 345). This is not to suggest that the sultan controlled local affairs in the precolonial Rif on a regular basis. But the sultan's officials in the Rif *were* able to collect taxes, even though they sometimes needed the sultan's troops to help them do so (Hart 1976:351; al-Duᶜayyif 1986[1818]:345).

Being an official representative of the sultan in the Rif was a lucrative position in that the state structure was based on "tax farming." Powerful local leaders would pay for governmental positions because they would then be entitled to a share of the taxes they collected as well as to enhanced status and power (Rezzouk 1905:268; Forbes 1924:101). For these reasons, the dominant *imgharen* competed to be the official representative (and tax collector) of the sultan. And dominant *imgharen* in adjacent *rbuᶜ* of the same *dhaqbitsh* were generally hostile to each other while being allied to dominant *imgharen* of adjacent *rbuᶜ* in neighboring *dhiqbaʾir* (see Hart 1976:316, 358–359). This is reminiscent of how men would ally themselves with non-kin against brothers and the sons of their father's brothers. Social proximity led to enmity and social distance to amity.

Conclusion

Hart's meticulously detailed data make clear that what he imagined to be a segmentary lineage system was in fact a network of *liff* alliances. In the precolonial Rif, the scale of segmentary sociability was inverted. Hostility was not directed outward toward strangers, but inward toward close kin with whom one was in direct competition for land. In many cases, people even hired "strangers" to kill their patrilateral kin (Hart 1976:329, 334–335).

Some might want to argue that no matter how unsegmentary Rifian behavior actually was, there was nonetheless a "norm" or "folk model" of segmentary sociability, as embodied in the verse, "Even if we fight among ourselves, we unite for war outside" (Hart 1976:168). But if any society having such ideals is segmentary, then there are no societies that are not. Moreover, such a diluted notion of segmentation is quite far removed from the segmentary lineage model that anthropologists like Hart have in mind when they use the term "segmentary." The latter model was not that of the precolonial Rifians.

In short, the segmentary lineage model is irrelevant insofar as precolonial Rifian social structure is concerned.

Notes

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data, which I have reinterpreted in the light of my own. My research in Morocco was made possible by grants from the Social Science Research Council (in 1976–77 and the summer of 1987) and the Fulbright-Hays Program of the Office of Education (1976–77).

Transliteration. I have followed Hart's transliteration of Rifian Berber (see Hart 1976:xxi). In transliterating Arabic words, I follow the standard system used by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* minus diacritics. The ʿ is the *ʿayn,* a pharyngeal fricative produced by pressing the root of the tongue against the back of the throat. The ʾ is the *hamza,* a glottal stop.

[1]For present purposes, I do not discuss the debate over the applicability of the segmentary model to the precolonial societies of the Nuer, the Tallensi, and the Tiv (see Holy 1979).

[2]After reading several earlier versions of this article, Hart has acknowledged the inapplicability of the segmentary lineage model in the Rif and will take a new position in his forthcoming book, *The Aith Waryaghar and their Rifian Neighbors* (1990). Thus, statements such as "Hart contends" should actually be in the past tense. But since Hart revised his earlier view of the Rif in response to this article, and since his revised view remains relatively unknown, the "ethnographic present" has been retained.

[3]Although my reinterpretation of Hart's segmentary analysis of the Rif may appear to mesh with the interpretivist view that Moroccan society is best seen as revolving around the "dyadic relations" between individuals, I would argue that such relations are structurally circumscribed to a far greater degree than the interpretivist literature would suggest. For two quite different critiques of the individualistic bias in Geertzian studies of Moroccan society and culture, see Dresch (1986) and Munson (1986).

[4]Raymond Jamous, in his very interesting book on the eastern Rif (1981), also fails to examine the relationship between data and analysis in Hart's work and accepts Hart's characterization of the Rif as "segmentary" without providing any data of his own that would justify this label (see Munson 1982).

[5]Some of the principal conceptions of "corporateness" are discussed in Fortes 1969:292–308.

[6]Wilfrid Rollman notes that the actual *mithqal* coin was no longer used in 1870, although it was still used as a "money of account" (personal communication, 1988). See Ayache (1979:130).

[7]Hart incorrectly injects the notion of "lineage" into his discussion of *shufʿa,* or "pre-emption" (1976:102). In Islamic law, the right of *shufʿa (shufʿath* in Rifian Berber) concerns co-owners of property *regardless of the relationship between them* (Hanoteau and Letourneux 1893:II:401). Such co-owners had priority rights with respect to the purchase of land being sold by a fellow co-owner.

[8]In 1977, I asked the late Rifi historian al-Hajj Ahmad al-Bu ʿAyyashi how long privately owned land had existed in the Rif. He said, "Since the Islamic conquest," that is, since the early 8th century. He could be right. It is certainly true that in some regions of Morocco various forms of land tenure were transformed into private property in the late 19th century (Lazarev 1966). But it would be a serious mistake to intepret the evolution of all private property in the sedentary highlands in this way. Berque cites land sales among the Seksawa of the High Atlas from the 16th and 17th centuries (1955:84, 363). I hope to locate deeds describing land sales in earlier centuries.

In stressing the importance of private property, I do not wish to deny the existence of social constraints upon its sale. Rifis may well have disapproved of land sales to non-agnates as well as to immigrants from other villages, as Jamous suggests for the eastern Rif (1981:135). But Hart's data show that such sales frequently occurred nonetheless (1976:114, 116, 329, 507–508).

[9]The history of the Rifian resistance to Spanish rule from 1921 through 1926 is well told by al-Hajj Ahmad al-Bu ʿAyyashi (1974, 1975), by Hart himself (1976), and by C. R. Pennell (1986).

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